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Tax Plannin
for Estates
by Bernard M. Mulvey

Bernard M. Mulvey, our Director of Tax Research, was with the Appellate Division of the Internal Revenue Service before joining TRB&S. He
is responsible for the weekly Tax Letter and Tax
Research Files which emanate from the Executive
office, and has written numerous articles on taxation.
His most recent work, which appeared in the May
issue of TAXES, "Year of Sale Depreciation", will
be reprinted in the NEW YORK LAW
JOURNAL
shortly.
A native of New York City, Mr. Mulvey received
his BS degree from New York University where he
majored in accounting, and an LLB from St. John's
University. He is presently completing his requirements for an LLM at New York University Graduate School of Law.
Mr. Mulvey is chairman of the Legislation and
Tax Reform Committee of the New York University Tax Society and is also a member of the Federal
Tax Forum.

Estate planning today has become a continuing lifetime proposition. An individual with wealth may face
estate tax problems whenever he is involved in a financial
or property transaction. His habits of gift-giving, his manner of buying property, the way he solves his marital problems—all have estate tax consequences.
However, to say that tax consequences are omnipresent
is not to say that they should be the tail that wags the
dog. It is important to remember that the most important
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factor in any estate plan remains the client's wishes for
the disposition of his money. Any sound estate plan must
be geared to the client and his particular economic and
personal situation. Tax considerations alone should never
dictate the disposition of an estate.
Tax planning should be undertaken only after what an
individual wishes to do with his money has been established. While good tax plans must and do vary from individual to individual, there are certain basic tools used
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by all estate planners in the construction of estate tax
plans. In the following paragraphs we will discuss many
of these, incorporating in our discussion several recent
developments in estate taxation which may necessitate
changes even in existing estate plans.
Use of Lifetime

Gifts

The simplest way to reduce an estate tax is to give away
property during one's lifetime so that there is less in the
estate to tax at death. While there is a tax on gifts, the
rates are about 25% lower than the estate tax rates. There
is a separate set of brackets, permitting a shift from top
to bottom rates, and the gift is computed at present value,
which hopefully is less than value at date of death. In
addition, through the use of the $3,000 annual exclusion
and the $30,000 lifetime exemption, substantial amounts
of property may be transferred without incurring any
tax at all. (A husband and wife, by splitting the gifts made
by either, may receive an annual exclusion of $6,000 and
a joint lifetime exemption of $60,000).
While lifetime gifts may seem a simple method to use,
in practice there are several pitfalls which must be
guarded against. For one, only complete gifts or irrevocable transfers in trust in which the settlor relinquishes
his rights and control over the property can succeed in
removing the property from the purview of the estate
tax. There must be a complete surrender of all interest
and control since, under sections 2036 ; 2037 and 2038 of
the Code, an estate tax will be imposed upon any life
transfer in which: 1) possession or enjoyment is retained
by the transferor until his death, 2) the transferor retained until his death the right to designate the persons
who should possess or enjoy the property, 3) the transferor retained a life estate until his death, or 4) the transferor retained the power to alter, amend, revoke or
terminate the gift until his death. Many a potential donor
has had strong reservations about making such a complete surrender of his property to his intended beneficiaries during his lifetime!
One interesting development in this area is the current
contention by the Internal Revenue Service that an individual who takes (or transfers) title to a residence in his
wife's name, but continues to live in the house for the rest
of his life, has in effect retained the possession or enjoyment of the property so that the residence is to be included in his gross estate upon his death. The IRS has
sporadically attempted to assert this position in the past
but early case law provided little support for it, the courts
generally holding that the property would not be in-
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eluded in the decedent's estate if it was conveyed without
any valid reservations or conditions whatsoever. O n the
other hand, a recent case 1 indicates that the courts are
now looking more to the actual substance of these transactions to determine if, in fact, a complete and unequivocal gift was made. Thus, a husband who makes a legal
transfer of residential property to his wife with an oral
agreement or understanding (whether or not enforceable
in a court of law) to the effect that he is to enjoy the use
thereof for his lifetime may now be unsuccessful in any
attempt to avoid inclusion of the property in his taxable
estate.
Even if the donor has made the necessary outright
transfer of the property in question, there always remains
the possibility that an estate tax will be imposed if the
transfer is determined to have been made "in contemplation of death." Under section 2035 of the Code, a rebuttable presumption is created that any transfer made by
the decedent within the three year period prior to his
death is made in contemplation thereof. O n the other
hand, transfers made before such three year period are
conclusively deemed not to have been made in contemplation of death. Thus, if the donor survives for three years
after the date of the gift, the Commissioner cannot assert
that the transfer was motivated by thoughts of death.
The fact that the donor dies within three years from
the date of the gift does not ipso facto result in inclusion
in the estate. If it can be established that a dominant living
purpose motivated the gift, then the presumption is rebutted. Thus, in cases involving young and middle-aged
donors in good health, it is seldom that the "contemplation of death" presumption is not rebutted by the estate.
Even in situations involving elderly people, when there
is some doubt whether the transfer will or will not be
deemed to have been made in contemplation of death,
such a transfer should still be advised in many cases. If
death should occur within the three year period the estate
has the right to introduce facts to prove that the thought
of death was not the inducement for the gift. At the very
least, this right gives the estate a powerful weapon in
bargaining discussions with the Service. In the rare case
where death occurs during the critical period and the
gift is conceded to have been made in contemplation
thereof, any gift tax paid or owed will serve to reduce
the donor's gross estate by the amount of the gift tax
(a gift tax is due on the transfer even if the gift was made
in contemplation of d e a t h ) . In addition, a credit is given
against the estate tax for the amount of the gift tax
paid. 2 Because of this so-called double deduction, in
T H E QUARTERLY

many cases estate taxes will actually be saved even if the
gift is deemed in contemplation of death.
T h e purchase of property in joint ownership presents
its own special problems. A common practice is for a
husband to purchase (with his funds) property in joint
ownership with his wife or children. It should be noted
that upon the husband's death the full value of such
property will be included in his estate for estate tax purposes. 3 Moreover, the husband may incur a gift tax liability at the time the property was purchased in joint
ownership. 4 (Even if the wife did contribute part of the
purchase price, the full value of the property is still
presumptively included in the husband's estate. T h e burden is then placed on the estate to trace back and establish that the wife's personal funds were so used.)
Once it is determined that a plan of lifetime gifts
should be adopted, a decision must then be made as to
whether the transfers should be in the form of outright
gifts or in trust. In many instances, an outright gift of
the property may not be feasible (for example, the beneficiary may be incapable of managing the property). It is
still possible to reduce the impact of estate taxes by making a gift in trust. To avoid inclusion, however, the trust
must be an irrevocable and unamendable one (that is,
the trust does not fall within the provisions of Sections
2036, 2037 and 2038 discussed above). By transferring
the property in trust and designating a reliable trustee
to administer the trust, the beneficiary will be afforded
the necessary protection.
In addition, where the total contemplated gift is substantial, it may be especially advisable to utilize the trust
form to save an estate tax on the second generation. Thus,
if a testator were to make a testamentary bequest to his
son, the property would be subject to an estate tax in his
estate and, subsequently, in that of his son. However;, if
the bequest was in the form of a trust which gave the
income from the property to' the son and, at the death of
the son, passed the principal to the son's children, there
would be no inclusion of the principal in the son's estate.
It is important to remember that any systematic plan
of gift-giving should not violate basic planning principles.
Thus, gifts should not be made which would leave the
donor frozen, or unable to conduct his usual business
affairs. Other factors to consider are possible increases in
the cost of living, later illness and other emergencies, and
the possible effect on the liquidity of the donor's estate.
These considerations may very well outweigh the tax
advantages to be gained by the transfers. A final caveat:
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the plan should always be sufficiently flexible so as to
permit changes as circumstances might, in future, dictate.
Use of Life

Insurance

Life insurance is an essential part of most sound estate
plans. In addition to its ability to protect dependents
against the loss of the insured's future earning power, it
can provide liquid funds for payment of estate expenses
and anticipated tax liabilities, thus precluding any inconvenience in administering and settling the estate because of difficulties in obtaining necessary cash. In addition, this cash liquidity can make unnecessary any forced
sale of assets (usually at a loss) because of tax-induced
pressures.
Life insurance is often used as a means to fund business
purchase arrangements. Thus, when a client has a partnership interest or owns stock in a close corporation, the
difficulties of finding a market for his interest at the time
of his death (or, on the other hand, the desire to ensure
that his holdings do not fall into alien hands) often
motivate him to enter into an agreement with his associates, employees, or the company itself whereby he
obligates his estate to sell his business interest to the
contracting party. T h e party of the second part, in turn,
obligates himself to purchase the interest at a certain
specified price. Insurance policies on the individual's life
often provide the necessary money with which the purchasers meet their obligations under such a contract.
Under section 2042 of the 1954 Code, proceeds received
from insurance policies on the life of a decedent are includible in his gross estate only if the policy is payable
to his estate or executor or if the decedent retained any
incidents of ownership in the policy at the time of his
death. Incidents of ownership include the power to assign
the policy, to borrow on the policy, and to designate or
change the beneficiaries of the policy. Section 2042 repealed the premium payment test existing under the
1939 Code so that the mere payment of the insurance
premiums by the insured is no longer a ground, in and
of itself, for inclusion of the proceeds in his gross estate.
It is now possible, therefore, for a person to transfer substantial amounts of assets free of transfer taxes (except
perhaps the gift tax) through premium payments on
policies on his own life. As seen above, as long as said
person is not the owner of any of the incidents of ownership in the policy at the time of his death, and his estate
is not the beneficiary of the policy, Section 2042 will not
be applicable.
One cautionary note should be sounded, however. The
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insurance provision in the Code has never been regarded
as exclusive and insurance proceeds not includible in the
gross estate under section 2042 may still be taxed as
property transferred in contemplation of death, or as a
transfer intended to take effect at death. Thus the Commissioner has, in the past, repeatedly attacked transfers
of insurance made within three years of the transferor's
death under the "contemplation of death" provision.
In recent days, the Service has been contending that
even the premiums paid on such policies by the insured
within the three years preceding his death constitute gifts
in contemplation of death under the statute. In this vein,
there is some indication that the Service, relying on Liebmann v Hassett 5 (a case which arose under the 1934 Act)
will attempt to include in the gross estate not just the
given premiums but, instead, that portion of the total
proceeds of the policy which the premiums deemed paid
in contemplation of death bear to the total premiums
paid.
There are at least two possible taxpayer counter-attacks
to this new Treasury onslaught. First, the taxpayer can
argue that, in view of the legislative history affecting life
insurance, it would seem that the Treasury is attempting
(at least in part) to reintroduce the premium payments
test which was expressly repudiated by Congress when
it enacted section 2042 of the 1954 Code. However, in
the writer's opinion, such an argument would be ineffective to prevent the inclusion in the gross estate of at least
the actual premium cost paid by the decedent during
the three years before his death. It is doubtful that the
courts would go along with the thesis that a gift which
is made in contemplation of death to pay life insurance
premium costs should be treated differently from any
other gift made in contemplation of death.
On the other hand, the legislative intent argument
might be successful in countering any Treasury attempt
to include in the decedent's estate a portion of the insurance proceeds based on the relationship between premiums paid during the critical period and the total
premiums paid. While it is true that in Liebmann v
Hassett (which arose before there was a premium payments test) the court included in the gross estate of the
decedent that portion of the proceeds of the insurance
policy which was related to the premiums he paid, the
court was basically faced with the problem of valuing a
gift of a life insurance policy which it had initially determined to be part of the decedent's gross estate because
it had been made in contemplation of death. Thus, policy
proceeds were placed in the insured's estate in Liebmann
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because a gift of the policy had been made in contemplation of death; not because the insured had paid any or
all premiums in contemplation of death.
A second possible counter-attack can be derived from
the statute itself. It should be remembered from the
previous discussion that section 2035 only creates a rebuttable presumption that any gift made within three
years of death is made in contemplation thereof. Thus,
even if one were to assume that section 2035 does have
applicability in the area of insurance premium payments
(which in the writer's opinion it does), it is important
to note that a transfer involving life insurance does not
in and of itself create an inference of contemplation of
death. If the taxpayer can show that a dominant living
purpose motivated the payment of the premiums by the
insured (e.g. payments were made pursuant to the provisions of a separation agreement), there will be no inclusion in the insured's gross estate by virtue of section
2035.
While these two approaches may have to be relied
upon in current cases involving decedents, it is possible
to avoid the predicament completely by proper estate
planning which would ensure that the beneficiary himself
pays the premiums after the policy has been transferred
to him. This may not be such an easy undertaking.
If the beneficiary is capable of paying the premiums
from his own financial sources, there is no difficulty. However, more often than not, a gift of life insurance is made
to a spouse or other object of the insured's bounty who
lacks sufficient personal funds to make the premium payments. If the insured were merely to transfer the necessary funds to the beneficiary who, in turn, made the
necessary payments, it is likely that the government would
contend that the insured indirectly had made the payments. However, whether or not the government has
authority to trace back through the years the sources of
premium payments, as it did under prior law, remains
to be seen.
A good approach to obviate this line of attack (using
for example purposes the husband-wife relationship)
might be to have the husband revise his estate planning
techniques. By adopting a systematic plan of making
outright gifts of property having an income potential to
his wife during his lifetime, the husband can provide his
spouse with an independent source of income (that is,
one in which no restrictions are imposed as to the use of
the income). Subsequently, if the wife were to take out
a policy on her husband's life (naming herself as beneficiary) , or the husband were to transfer an existing policy
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to his wife, relinquishing all incidents of ownership, she
would then be in a position to make the premium payments. In this way, no part of the insurance proceeds or
premiums would be included in the husband's gross
estate (assuming the husband lived in excess of three
years from the date the policy was transferred), since
case 6 law has held that whereas the principal property
transferred by a husband to a wife is traceable back to the
husband, the income from such principal is deemed to
be the sole property of the donee wife, ab initio. Of
course, the husband must pay a gift tax on the value of
the transferred property a n d / o r the life insurance policy,
but this would be at a substantially lower rate.
No discussion of the latest developments in this insurance area would be complete without reference to the
recent Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v Noel. 7
In the Noel case the Third Circuit had held that the
proceeds from an airplane accident insurance policy
(commonly called flight insurance) were not includible
in a decedent's gross estate as "life insurance" under section 2042(2). The court reasoned that, unlike the life
insurance policy, such a contract was in effect an agreement to indemnify the insured (or in case of death, his
beneficiary) for any loss sustained by reason of a certain
event (an accident) which might or might not occur.
Life insurance, on the other hand, was deemed to be a
contract by which the insurer agreed to pay a specified
sum upon the occurrence of an inevitable event (the
death of the insured), regardless of its cause. The Court,
in construing section 2042(2), held that its purpose was
to encompass only the regular type of life insurance policies in which it could be said that the insured acquired
an immediate estate, and not accident policies in which
neither insured nor beneficiary acquired anything more
than a defeasible right.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Third
Circuit viewpoint in its holding that Federal estate taxes
could be collected on flight insurance proceeds. In the
Court's viewpoint, the only way in which such taxation
could be avoided would be for the insured to irrevocably
sign away his right to the policy, including his right to
change the beneficiary. (It would seem to the writer,
however, that any such irrevocable transfer of rights will
inevitably be attacked by the Service under the "contemplation of death" provisions).
Use of the Marital

Deduction

As provided in section 2056 of the Internal Revenue
Code, there may be deducted from the gross estate of a
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decedent an amount equal to the value of property passing
to his surviving spouse to the extent that such property
does not exceed 50% of the decedent's "adjusted gross
estate." In general, the "adjusted gross estate" is equal to
the gross estate reduced by the amount of any community
property included therein and less expenses, claims, losses
and certain taxes.
This marital deduction is one of the most important
tax savings devices for estate planners. When properly
utilized, it can effectuate substantial savings in the transfer taxes paid by a family in passing its wealth from one
generation to the next. However, a word of caution —
the courts construe the marital deduction provision strictly
and deny the benefits thereof in cases where the terms of
the instrument are at variance with the requirements of
the Code.
The basic requirement in section 2056 is that property
qualifying for the marital deduction must be includible
in the surviving spouse's gross estate if still in his or her
possession at time of death (the terminable interest restriction) . T h e simplest form of qualifying provision is
an outright bequest to the spouse. On the other hand, an
example of a bequest that would be disqualified is one
"to my spouse for life, remainder to x" since, in this
latter case, the value of the subject property would not
be included in the surviving spouse's estate upon death.
As can be seen from the above, problems in this area
will arise when, for one reason or another, an outright
gift to the surviving spouse is considered inadvisable. (For
example, a husband wishing his wife to receive income
from a marital trust solely, can qualify the trust for the
deduction by granting the surviving spouse a general
power of appointment as to the remainder.) In such case,
careful will drafting is called for to ensure that the disposition does not violate the terminable interest provisions.
One recent development in this area has been the issuance of Revenue Procedure 64-19. 8 The background
prompting its issuance was as follows. Soon after the
marital deduction was first introduced into the tax law,
estate planners devised ingenious formulas to ensure that
the deceased's estate would receive the maximum marital
deduction (that is, fifty percent of the adjusted gross
estate). The so-called pecuniary formula bequest was introduced under which, in terms, the surviving spouse
was left property in an amount exactly equal to fifty
percent of the testator's adjusted gross estate, as finally
determined for estate tax purposes (less property passing
to the widow outside the will but includible in the gross
estate).
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Problems arose when the assets in the estate appreciated before the date of distribution over their federal
estate tax values. Under the income tax laws, the satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest with such appreciated
property would result in a capital gain to the estate. 9
T h e problem was met by the use of a provision in conjunction with any formula bequest which permitted the
executor to satisfy the marital bequest by a distribution
in cash or in kind, at values as finally determined for
estate tax purposes.
This power granted to the executor enabled him to
manipulate the assets in the estate so that in many cases
the estate got the full fifty percent marital deduction
when much less than fifty percent of the estate (at date
of distribution values) was distributed to the widow.
Particularly in cases where the wife had a substantial
estate of her own, the executor would allocate to- her
those assets that had depreciated in value from the federal
estate tax valuation date. The appreciated assets were, in
turn, diverted over to the residuary beneficiaries (usually
the children).
Revenue Procedure 64-19 attempts to solve the problem by setting forth certain rules whereby the marital
deduction will be allowed in the full amount of a pecuniary bequest if under applicable state law or by the
express or implied provisions of the will either:
1) the fiduciary must distribute in satisfaction thereof assets having a market value on the date or dates of
distribution at least equal to the amount of the bequest, or
2) the fiduciary must distribute assets, including cash,
fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation in
the value of all property available for distribution.
If the estate cannot show that either of these requirements is met, the Service presumably will disallow a marital deduction for the bequest.
Ever since the marital deduction was first introduced
in the Internal Revenue Code, estate planners have devised elaborate schemes for its maximum utilization. In
too many instances, the testator's wishes have been sacrificed solely to effectuate a savings in the estate tax. It
should be emphasized that a married estate owner is
not compelled to use the marital deduction. Thus, if a
client doesn't want his wife to have the requisite degree
of control over the property or even if he just prefers
to leave the bulk of his property to> someone other than
his wife, his wishes should control. Again, if his wife has
a substantial estate of her own, any estate tax savings
now through the use of the marital deduction may subject her estate to even greater estate taxes. In short, the
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point to keep in mind is that the marital deduction is
merely a device to save taxes and, in common with similar devices discussed above, should never be recommended or employed without careful consideration of
all relevant factors.
Conclusion
Once an estate tax plan is decided upon, using any or
all of the devices mentioned above, it should not then
be pigeon-holed pending the eventuality of death. A
system of periodic review should be adopted so that the
plan can be reexamined in the light of the current family
and economic conditions and the ever-continuing evolution of estate tax provisions.
The time has long since passed when a standard-form
will, purchased at the corner drug store, constituted an
adequate estate plan. However, unlike the income tax
area, there is still a high degree of unawareness as to
possible alternatives and elections in this ever-growing
field. Expert advice should be utilized at all stages of the
estate planning process so that the fruits of a lifetime of
work are not dissipated.
If the entire estate planning team, the accountant, the
attorney, the insurance man, and the trust officer, cooperate in the planning process, the benefit of the experience, knowledge, and advice of each in his separate
field can be coordinated to provide a plan to satisfy the
client's wishes and, at the same time, take advantage of
the best methods of minimizing taxes.
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In Union Planters National Bank, Exr. v. U.S., 65-1 U S T C
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